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Abstract
Constructing adversarial perturbations for deep neural networks is an
important direction of research. Crafting image-dependent adversarial per-
turbations using white-box feedback has hitherto been the norm for such
adversarial attacks. However, black-box attacks are much more practical for
real-world applications. Universal perturbations applicable across multiple
images are gaining popularity due to their innate generalizability. There have
also been efforts to restrict the perturbations to a few pixels in the image. This
helps to retain visual similarity with the original images making such attacks
hard to detect. This paper marks an important step which combines all these
directions of research. We propose the DEceit algorithm for constructing ef-
fective universal pixel-restricted perturbations using only black-box feedback
from the target network. We conduct empirical investigations using the Ima-
geNet validation set on the state-of-the-art deep neural classifiers by varying
the number of pixels to be perturbed from a meagre 10 pixels to as high as
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Figure 1: We compare the quality of universal adversarial perturbations generated by DEceit with increasing number
of perturbed pixels (respectively 10, 100, 1000, 5000, 10000, and all of 50176 pixels in images of resolution 224 × 224)
on the ImageNet validation set, for two state-of-the-art deep neural network classifiers, viz. VGG16 and GoogleNet. To
compensate for the extremely low number of pixels, the allowable distortion is set to [-128, 128] for 10 pixels, [-30, 30]
for 100 pixels, [-20, 20] for 1000 pixels and the conventional [-10, 10] thereafter. (a) When all pixels are allowed to be
perturbed, DEceit (our proposed black-box method) achieves a better Fooling Rate (FR) than the white-box UAP [15] on
both classifiers. Moreover, DEceit achieves a commendable FR of 66% and 60% respectively on VGG16 and GoogleNet
when only 5000 pixels are allowed to be perturbed. This indicates that it is indeed feasible to generate an effective universal
perturbations by only modifying a restricted number of pixels. (b) DEceit also achieves better PSNR values compared to
UAP indicating a higher similarity of the perturbed image with the corresponding original.
all pixels in the image. We find that perturbing only about 10% of the pixels
in an image using DEceit achieves a commendable and highly transferable
Fooling Rate while retaining the visual quality. We further demonstrate that
DEceit can be successfully applied to image dependent attacks as well. In
both sets of experiments, we outperformed several state-of-the-art methods.
1 Introduction
The Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) are susceptible to perturbations in the
input [28] even after demonstrating remarkable efficiency on challenging computer
vision tasks, akin to the vulnerable heel of the mighty Achilles. As CNNs are
being increasingly deployed in critical applications like autonomous driving, fraud
detection, etc. their sensitivity to perturbations can result in serious adversity. This
inspired the research community to consider the study of adversarial perturbations
as immensely important and subsequently venture diverse schools of thought.
Adversarial perturbations can be devised using two main strategies, viz. white-
box and black-box attacks. In the white-box setting, which has been widely
explored [2, 8, 16], the attacker has full access to the parameters, the gradients of
the loss function concerning the target class label(s) to the input image(s), and the
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architecture of the CNN which is to be attacked. In contrast, in the relatively less
explored black-box setting [21], the attacker only has access to the decisions made
by the target classifier. Since black-box approaches like [4, 9] do not rely on any
classifier-intrinsic information, the resulting perturbations generally have greater
transferability compared to white-box attacks. Moreover, black-box attacks are
more practical as model-specific information is often unavailable in real-world
settings.
From a different perspective, adversarial attacks on CNNs can also be classified
into image-dependent and universal categories. Image-Dependent Attacks (IDA)
like [14,30] allow distinct perturbations to be employed for different images, result-
ing in a significant loss of the classification accuracy for the target CNN. Universal
Adversarial Attacks (UAAs) like [15,17,18,22], on the other hand, attempt to craft
perturbations which can be applied to any natural image (irrespective of content
and provenance) to mislead the target classifier. As a result, UAAs generally exhibit
better generalizability to previously unseen images. Moreover, UAAs are also
more computationally efficient as there is no need to recompute perturbations for
every individual image.
Another emerging direction of research [19] investigates the potential for
misleading the CNN classifiers by perturbing a limited number of pixels in the
images. The authors in [26] attempted to test the extent of such restricted image
dependent perturbation and found that manipulating merely a single pixel can
result in a successful attack. This suggests that identifying and perturbing the
pixels which are most critical for classification (as opposed to perturbing the entire
image) may be sufficient to induce misclassification. Further, limiting the number
of pixels to be perturbed generally results in perturbations which are imperceptible
to human eyes. Such attacks are especially menacing as they can pass undetected
even if the autonomous system is accompanied by human users.
In light of the above discussion, in this article, we attempt for the first time,
to devise pixel-restricted i.e. sparse perturbations for universal attacks by using
black-box feedback. The pixel-restriction means that we must identify the most
critical pixels among a potentially large number of pixels, depending on the size
of the input images. Moreover, the optimization problem by nature is extremely
high-dimensional (for example, given a RGB image of resolution 224 × 224, in
case of DEceit the dimension of the problem may reach a maximum of 250880
when all pixels are allowed to be perturbed). Consequently, a brute-force search
of the whole search space is not computationally feasible. Moreover, the black-
box setting means that no gradient information is available from the target CNN,
ruling-out the use of gradient-based optimization schemes. To address this issue,
we propose to use a powerful population-based stochastic optimization technique
called Differential Evolution (DE) [25] to find suitable perturbations. DE is
remarkably efficient over diverse optimization scenarios like constrained, multi-
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modal, multi-objective problems, owing to the decades of research effort devoted to
improving its scalability, convergence [20], and robustness [5]. Recently, SwitchDE
[7] showed that a simple parameter, as well as mutation switching strategy, can
be very effective for high-dimensional optimization problems by achieving an
effective trade-off between the exploratory and exploitative search behaviors of
DE. Our proposed DE based adversarial perturbation generation scheme, DEceit,
combines the mutation switching strategy from SwitchDE with uniform random
scale-factor switching (see Section 3.4) to effectively solve the high-dimensional
optimization problem. The effectiveness of DEceit in comparison to UAP is
illustrated in Figure 1, which validates that even by perturbing merely 10% of
total number of pixels DEceit can achieve an admirable Fooling Rate (FR) on both
CNNs while maintaining a better visual quality.
The principal highlights of our proposal are in order:
1. We add to the existing literature by proposing DEceit, which is capable of
crafting effective universal perturbations by modifying only a small fraction
of the fixed pixels for any image using just black-box feedback from the
network under attack. This combines the practicality of the black-box setting
with the robustness of UAAs while keeping the perturbed images similar to
the original images, making detection and prevention challenging.
2. Unlike [1, 26] we consider the large scale and high-dimensional nature
of the optimization problem related to adversarial perturbations. Hence,
we have synthesized the DEceit algorithm by augmenting the DE with
two fundamental changes: a random parameter switching strategy and the
success-based mutation strategy adopted from [7]. Further, we employ a
simple encoding scheme which can inherently impose the sparsity constraint.
3. We demonstrate that DEceit can directly be used to construct effective image-
dependent perturbations as well.
Subsequent to the introductory Section 1, we establish the background in
Section 2 and detail DEceit in Section 3. In Section 4 we carry out an extensive
comparison with the state-of-the-art techniques to establish the capability of DEceit
to generate sparse perturbations which can effectively perform UAA and IDA in
a black box setting. Finally, we make concluding remarks and discuss future
extensions in Section 5.
2 Related Works
The work of [19] has recently been carried forward by researches such as [3,13,26]
which showed that sparse perturbations are not only effective but are also likely to
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offer better imperceptibility. However, these notable attempts for generating sparse
and efficient adversarial perturbation have only been applied for IDAs. In case of
UAAs the complexity of the problem considerably increases as it becomes even
more difficult to find a limited set of pixels, modifying which will affect a large set
of images containing variety of objects in differing scales, lighting conditions, etc.
Evolutionary Optimization (EvO) algorithms gained popularity in devising
adversarial perturbations as they can handle large scale problems and are especially
useful in black box setting. A couple of works [1, 26] attempted to respectively
utilize DE and Genetic Algorithm (GA) to carry out successful IDA. However,
as discussed earlier, the underlying optimization problem is extremely high di-
mensional in nature which [1] did not consider and [26] avoided by restricting
themselves to one pixel attack. This led them to rely on the canonical variants of
the EvO algorithms which alongside being ineffective in large scale optimization
problem are susceptible to the curse of dimensionality.
3 Proposed Method
An image I is conventionally represented in the form of a third-order tensor
i.e. I ∈ Rw×h×c, where w, h and c are positive integers respectively denoting
the width, height and the number of channels of the image. Depending on the
application, the components of I can be further constrained and bounded. Here,
for simplicity without loss of generality, we assume any component Ipqr ∈ [0, 255],
for all p ∈ [1, w], q ∈ [1, h], and r ∈ [1, c], where [a, b] denotes the closed set of all
integers between a and b. Further, let a dataset S = {I1, I2, · · · , Im} be a collection
of m images, where each image can be classified into one of the C predefined
classes. Classification can be represented as finding the many-to-one mapping
y : S → C, where C = {1, 2, · · · , C}. CNN classifiers, being supervised learning
algorithms, attempt to approximate y as yˆ, utilizing the information provided
through a set X ⊆ S of training examples such that for all I ∈ X the true class
label y(I) is known in advance.
3.1 Universal Attack
The vulnerability of CNNs to adversarial attack may originate from its learning
mechanism. The decision strategy learned by the network to correctly identify a
class can be effectively exploited by a perturbation leading to a misclassification
[12]. This indicates the possibility of a UAA attack exploiting an amalgamation of
the network’s decision strategies for the individual classes.
Given an original image I ∈ S which is correctly classified as belonging to the
class, j ∈ C, a perturbed image is created as I¯ = ψ(I + ∆), where ∆ ∈ Rw×h×c
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is a perturbation tensor and ψ(·) is a function ensuring (by proper scaling and/or
bounding) that the addition adheres to the properties of an image. Hence, our
objective of designing a UAA can be reduced to finding a perturbation ∆, which
maximizes the probability of misclassifying I¯:
maxP(∆) =
∑
I∈S
Pr(yˆ(ψ(I + ∆)) 6= j), (1)
s.t. − β ≤ ∆pqr ≤ β, (2)
where β is an user-defined parameter controlling the extent of distortion in one
component of the perturbation tensor ∆pqr for all p ∈ [1, w], q ∈ [1, h], r ∈ [1, c],
and Pr(·) denotes the probability of an event.
3.2 Sparse Perturbation
Perturbing every pixel of an image may lead to a compromised visual quality. An
attractive alternative may come in the form of sufficient perturbation of limited
number of critical pixels. Such a perturbation will likely be capable of performing
a successful attack alongside improved imperceptibility. This would enable the
UAA to be sparse in nature, consequently improving the visual similarity between
the original images and the corresponding perturbed images. However, such a
sparsity constraint poses additional difficulty for the high-dimensional UAA search
problem. First, one needs to recognize the pixels which are critical for correctly
identifying a majority of the classes. Thereafter, a suitable subset containing a
predetermined number of pixels must be selected and efficiently perturbed to obtain
the optimal sparse universal perturbation.
3.3 Black-Box Feedback
The challenge of finding an effective adversarial perturbation further increases
in a black-box setting, which restricts utilization of the image-to-class decision
mappings expressed through the network architecture and learned parameters.
However, such restrictions allow a black-box method to be independent of the CNN
under attack. Consequently, perturbation obtained through black-box methods is
expected to provide improved robustness and transferability compared to those
found by white-box attacks. For a black-box setting, one may choose to maximize
the FR i.e. the number of misclassified images, instead of directly maximizing
the probability of misclassification. Thus, the optimization problem in (1) can be
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Figure 2: DEceit attempts to iteratively improve the quality of a population of candidate perturbations (number of
pixel to be perturbed ρ = 5000 and distortion β = 10) to find the optimal solution of Q. First a parent perturbation
∆i for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n is mutated to generate Γi. Subsequently, Γi and ∆i go through a crossover step to form Θi.
The perturbation Θi may not adhere to the constraints of Q, and thus the bound restriction is imposed. Finally, Q(∆i)
and Q(Θi) are both applied to the set S of images and evaluated. Θi replaces ∆i in the population if found to better
optimize Q, i.e. Q(∆i) ≥ Q(Θi). Note that the perturbations are color inverted for the ease of visualization while their
encoding/decoding which might be necessary for the implementation of DEceit are ignored for simplicity.
revised for a sparse black-box setting as follows:
maxQ(∆) =
∑
I∈S
I(yˆ(ψ(I + ∆)) 6= y(I)), (3)
s.t. − β ≤ ∆pqr ≤ β, (4)
and
w∑
p=1
h∑
q=1
I(∆pq 6= 0) = ρ, (5)
where I(·) is an indicator function which outputs 1 if the input condition is true
and 0 otherwise, ∆pq denotes a pixel in ∆, and ρ is an user defined parameter
controlling the allowable number of pixels which can be perturbed.
3.4 Differential Evolution based Optimization
Due to the black-box setting and the complex nature of problem Q in (3), standard
gradient-based optimization cannot be used to obtain an efficient solution. Instead
one may employ EvO techniques in an attempt to find a near-optimal solution
after a finite number of generations. An EvO algorithm achieves this by iteratively
improving the quality of a population of candidate solutions through exploration
(diversifying coarse search in large volume) and exploitation (intensifying de-
tailed search in small volume) of the search space [20]. Among the various EvO
techniques tailored for diverse optimization problems, DE is known to be highly
effective for real-valued, global optimization problems like Q [5]. Due to the
large scale and high-dimensional nature of Q, we specifically incorporate some
modifications to equip DE for the task, resulting in the DEceit algorithm.
7
p(1)
q
(1) ...
r
(1)
1
r
(1)
c
p
(ρ)
q
(ρ) ...
r
(ρ)
1
r
(ρ)
c
...Δ′
i
Figure 3: A perturbation ∆i encoded as ∆′i for using in DEceit. The total dimension of the encoding is (c + 2) × ρ,
which may be considered as ρ groups of (c+ 2) elements. Given such a group the first two elements p(i) and q(i) denote
the position respective to width and height of the i-th pixel to be perturbed, where i = 1, 2, · · · , ρ. On the other hand,
the last c places r(i)1 , r
(i)
2 , · · · , r(i)c hold the noises for the c channels. Such an encoding can directly handle the sparsity
constraint (5) by implicitly considering the value of ρ during design.
3.4.1 Algorithm Overview:
Before proceeding to a detailed discussion, we first provide a schematic workflow
of DEceit in Figure 2 to highlight the key steps involved in the process. Given
the problem Q, the DEceit algorithm starts by randomly initializing a population
N = {∆1,∆2, · · ·∆n} of n candidate perturbations. However, simply representing
a perturbation as a natural tensor of the same size of the original image will not be
effective as the different evolutionary operations may end up violating the sparsity
constraint (5). Thus, during the DE operations instead of the original perturbation
tensor ∆i we consider an encoded vector representation ∆′i having a dimension of
(c+ 2)× ρ as detailed in Figure 3, which by design adheres to (5). Hereafter, we
denote an encoded perturbation using a dashed notation of their tensor counterpart.
Thereafter, every iteration of DEceit consists of the following four steps: First, a
trial solution Γ′i corresponding to each of the current solutions ∆
′
i is created as a
linear combination of three other candidate solutions using one of the following
mutation schemes as explained in the subsequent section discussing mutation
switching strategy:
DE/rand/1: Γ′i = ∆
′
u1 + F (∆
′
u2 −∆′u3), or (6)
DE/best/1: Γ′i = ∆
′
b + F (∆
′
u2 −∆′u3), (7)
where F is the scale-factor, ∆′b is the encoded representation of the best perturbation
in N , and ∆′u1, ∆
′
u2, ∆
′
u3 are selected randomly from N without replacement and
differ from the current solution ∆′i. Following mutation, Γ
′
i goes through an
arithmetic crossover operation as shown in (8) to generate the final offspring
solution Θ′i as average of Γ
′
i and the corresponding candidate solution ∆
′
i:
Θ′i = 0.5∆
′
i + 0.5Γ
′
i. (8)
The generated offspring vector Θ′i is subsequently corrected (as explained during
the discussion on bound correction) to adhere to constraint (4) and decoded to
retrieve the perturbation Θi. Finally in the selection stage, Θi is compared with the
corresponding decoded candidate solution ∆i so as to greedily retain the encoded
form of the better of the two in N :
∆′i =
{
Θ′i if Q(Θi) ≥ Q(∆i),
∆′i otherwise.
(9)
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3.4.2 Mutation Switching Strategy:
Only exploratory search will result in delayed or no convergence whereas an only
exploitative search might push the population towards a local optimum. Striking a
proper balance between these two extremes is critical for high-dimensional search
scenarios. The DEceit search mechanism is controlled together by the scale factor
F and the chosen mutation strategy. For every candidate solution in the population,
we switch the value of F between 0.5 and 2 in a uniformly randomized way. When
F attains the larger value, the greater weighting of the difference (∆′u2 − ∆′u3)
helps to the formation of a trial solution which is distant from base solution (∆′u1 or
∆′b depending on the chosen mutation strategy). On the other hand, when F attains
the value of 0.5, the trial solution lies close to the current base member (∆′u1 or
∆′b), leading to exploitation of already identified regions of the search space. The
choice of F in a uniform random manner can help stagnant solutions out of local
minima.
While the ‘DE/rand/1’ mutation strategy encourages exploration or exploitation
based on the chosen F , ‘DE/best/1’ draws the population close to the current best
solution. DEceit chooses either of the two mutation strategies for every candidate
solution, in every generation, based on the success history in the last generation.
This means that the same mutation strategy as the last generation is retained only if
it had resulted in a final offspring superior to the corresponding candidate solution.
Thus, the scale factor and mutation strategy together decide the trade-off between
the exploratory and exploitative searching capability of DEceit.
3.4.3 Bound Corrections:
While the encoding implicitly handles the sparsity constraint (5), the algebraic
operations in mutation and crossover may still result in an invalid offspring. Consid-
ering the case for the i-th pixel to be perturbed where i = 1, 2, · · · , c, a constraint
violation may happen in the following three ways, all of which can be easily rec-
tified. First, if any of the location specifiers p(i) and q(i) is not an integer, then
they can be set to their ceiling values. Second, if any of p(i) and q(i) do no respec-
tively lie in the range of [1, w] and [1, h], then they can be reinitialized in their
corresponding range. Third, if any of r(i)1 , r
(i)
2 , · · · , r(i)c fails to satisfy the bound
constraint (4), then the concerned component can be rectified by reinitializing with
a real number between −β and β. We detail the complete method in Algorithm 1.
4 Experimental Evaluation
All of our experiments are performed on ImageNet 2012 validation set [23], con-
taining 50000 images spread across 1000 classes. To tackle the issue of diverse
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Algorithm 1 DEceit
Input: S: Set of images for UAA/ singleton for IDA. ρ: Number of allowable pixels for perturbation
(if sparsity is not required then set ρ = wh). t: Maximum allowable epochs, n: Population size.
Output: An adversarial perturbation ∆.
1: Randomly initialize n perturbations ∆1,∆2, · · · ,∆n, such that all ∆i ∈ Rw×h×c and follow
constraints (4-5). Form a population N = {∆′1,∆′2, · · · ,∆′n} by encoding ∆is for all i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n}. Randomly initialize vector s = {si|si ∈ {0, 1},∀l ∈ [1, n]}. Calculate the
initial fitness as e = {ei|ei = Q(∆i),∀i ∈ [1, n]}.
2: for t epochs do
3: for i ∈ [1, n] do
4: Select a random scale-factor F ∈ {0.5, 2}.
5: If si = 0, then generate mutated solution Γ′i as per (6). Otherwise, generate Γ
′
i as per (7).
6: Perform crossover to generate perturbation Θ′i by (8).
7: Perform bound corrections on Θ′i and retrieve Θi.
8: Perform selection as per (9). If ∆i is selected over Θi then set si = 1− si. Otherwise,
set ∆′i = Θ
′
i and ei = Q(Θi).
9: end for
10: end for
11: Return the best performing perturbation ∆b.
resolution we have extracted a 224 × 224 center patch from each of the images.
We have chosen two state-of-the-art CNN classifiers namely VGG16 [24] and
Inception1 [27, 29].
To quantitatively evaluate the performance of DEceit we have used the con-
ventional FR index, while the visual similarity of the perturbed image with the
corresponding original one is measured by Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) [11].
To attenuate any bias which may originate from the randomness implicit to DEceit,
we report the median result among 11 independent runs in all our experiments.
The number of population members of DEceit is set to 50, while the number of
generations is set to be 50.
4.1 Ablation Study
We start by justifying the motivation behind DEceit through an ablation study
detailed in Table 1. We can observe that compared to a benchmark of absolute ran-
dom perturbations, better UAA can be performed if only the distortions are allowed
to be optimized by EvO algorithm such as DE at random pre-determined pixel
positions. If we allow both the pixel locations and the distortion to be optimized
by EvO algorithms by maximizing Q, then an even higher FR can be achieved
despite the number of perturbed pixels being greatly reduced. However, compared
1Depending on the result reported by the contending algorithm Inception may mean either
GoogleNet or Inception V3.
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to other widely popular EvO algorithms such as GA [1] and CMA-ES [10], DE
achieves a better FR validating its applicability to the problem of adversarial attack
generation. However, as mentioned earlier, vanilla DE is not tailored to handle a
large-scale, high-dimensional optimization problem. Thus replacing it with DEceit
further improves in performance as can be seen by contrasting the last two results
in Table 1.
Table 1: Ablation study of DEceit on performing UAA.
Method ρ β Fooling Rate (%)
VGG16 Inception
Random pixels randomly perturbed 200∗ 128 35.14 34.22
Random pixels perturbed by DE 200∗ 128 37.96 36.94
Q optimized by GA 10 128 38.02 37.03
Q optimized by CMA-ES 10 128 38.11 37.15
Q optimized by DE 10 128 39.22 37.86
DEceit (Ours) 10 128 46.79 44.23
∗: To compensate for an unoptimized perturbation we set a higher ρ at 200.
4.2 Universal Adversarial Attacks
We compare DEceit with the state-of-the-art universal non-targeted attack methods
namely UAP [15], FFF [17], NAG [18], and GAP [22] in Table 22. We observe
from Table 2 that on VGG16 the proposed method outperforms the competitors
while being the second best on Inception in terms of both the measures, when all
pixels are perturbed (with identical β). This indicates that DEceit is indeed capable
of achieving a competitive performance. Moreover, a qualitative comparison of
the generated universal perturbations for UAP, FFF, and DEceit is presented in
Figure 4. It is evident from Figure 4 that compared to UAP and FFF the two
benchmark white box UAA techniques, the adversarial examples generated by
black box method DEceit are minimally distorted from their corresponding original
images, even when all pixels are allowed to be perturbed. From Table 2 and Figure
1, we observe that with increasing sparsity, the FR decreases while the PSNR
improves. However DEceit provides a perturbation of commendable quality while
preserving the visual similarity by only manipulating about 10% of the total pixels.
To further evaluate the robustness of DEceit compared to its contenders, we
conduct a transferability [22] study. From Table 3 we observe that all three variants
of DEceit achieve better transferability than the other methods3 on both classifiers,
demonstrating the higher robustness of the proposed method. Interestingly, the
perturbation generated by NAG which performs well on Inception (as observed
in Table 2) fails on VGG16, indicating its lower robustness compared to DEceit.
2Results are quoted from the original articles.
3For GAP no transferability to Inception is available.
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Figure 4: We take six images from ImageNet 2012 validation set and apply the perturbation obtained from UAP, FFF
(for UAP and FFF pre-trained perturbations are obtained from the original articles), and DEceit (the different variants are
named as DEceit-ρ-β). In all cases, the perturbed image is misclassified by the pre-trained VGG16. We can see that
compared to the white-box methods, DEceit can generate a successful adversarial example with minimal distortion. The
effect of perturbation (the values of the perturbed pixels are propagated to their neighbors for the ease of visualization)
is almost imperceptible when ρ = 10. Even though with ρ = 50176, DEceit generates perturbed images where the
distortion is somewhat apparent, the visual quality is still better compared to UAP and FFF.
Table 2: Comparison of DEceit with non-targeted UAA methods.
Method ρ β Fooling Rate (%) PSNR (dB)
VGG16 Inception V3 GoogleNet VGG16 Inception V3 GoogleNet
UAP 50176 10 78.37 NA 77.74 29.25 NA 28.45
FFF 50176 10 47.25 NA 56.59 27.12 NA 24.56
NAG 50176 10 77.57 90.37 NA NA NA NA
GAP 50176 10 83.70 82.70 NA NA NA NA
DEceit
(Ours)
10 128 46.79 44.23 44.44 65.12 65.01 68.99
100 30 56.22 52.86 54.55 56.76 57.01 58.69
1000 20 62.05 53.11 57.69 48.25 48.22 49.58
5000 10 65.66 59.55 61.56 44.16 45.01 46.89
10000 10 68.95 63.25 66.89 38.96 37.57 39.44
50176 10 83.96 83.03 84.96 33.14 32.99 33.25
NA: The pre-trained perturbations are not available for computing Fooling Rate & PSNR.
Moreover, the transferability of DEceit only slightly changes with the choices of ρ,
suggesting that the proposed method is mostly resilient to the extent of sparsity.
Such improved robustness of DEceit possibly arises due to its black-box setting
and the efficient search capability.
4.3 Image-Dependent Attacks
While we primarily developed DEceit for UAAs, it can directly be applied for
IDA by feeding S as a singleton set containing only the image to be perturbed.
Following convention we evaluate the efficacy of DEceit for IDA by comparing
its performance on a subset of ImageNet 2012 validation set (containing 2000
correctly classified images) with the state-of-the-art such as PBBA [14], GAP [22],
LogBarrier [6], SIMBA [19], GenAttack [1], SparseFool [13], and OPA [26] in
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Table 3: Transferability of DEceit compared to UAA methods.
Method ρ β Transferability (%)
VGG164 Inception5
UAP 50176 10 89.64 92.71
FFF 50176 10 74.52 71.66
NAG 50176 10 86.86 62.41
DEceit
(Ours)
10 128 99.98 96.79
5000 10 99.84 95.83
50176 10 99.14 95.21
4Transferability from VGG16 to Inception.
5Transferability from Inception to VGG16.
Table 4: Comparison of DEceit with non-targeted IDA methods.
Method ρ β No. of Attacked Avg. Fooling
Images Network Query Rate (%)
PBBA 50176 0.05 50000 Inc. V3 722 98.5
DEceit (Ours) 50176 0.05 2000 Inc. V3 535 99.2
GAP 50176 10 50000 Inc. V3 NA 98.3
DEceit (Ours) 50176 10 2000 Inc. V3 NA 100
LogBarrier 50176 8 500 ResNet 50 NA 95.2
DEceit (Ours) 50176 8 2000 ResNet 50 NA 99.1
SIMBA 50176 3 1000 Inc. V3 1284 97.8
DEceit (Ours) 50176 3 2000 Inc. V3 650 98.1
GenAttack 50176 0.05 2000 Inc. V3 11081 78.4
DEceit (Ours) 50176 0.05 2000 Inc. V3 535 99.2
SparseFool 70246 255 2000 Inc. V3 NA 100
DEceit (Ours) 7024 255 2000 Inc. V3 NA 100
OPA 1 128 2000 Inc. V3 NA 37.25
DEceit (Ours) 1 128 2000 Inc. V3 NA 46.12
6Average number of perturbed pixels.
Table 4. SparseFool (with default parameter setting) and DEceit are evaluated on
the same set of images, while the results of the other contenders are quoted from the
original papers (DEceit is run with identical ρ and β). However, the comparative
study may only be considered as indicative as the contending algorithms may
have been run on different random sets of images. We can observe from Table
4 that compared to PBBA and GAP our method achieves a competitive FR on a
lesser number of images. Moreover, DEceit outperforms (even on higher number
of images) LogBarrier, SIMBA, GenAttack, and OPA, using a lesser number of
average queries, supporting its efficiency in performing IDA. Further, DEceit
performs comparable to SparseFool, while incurring a higher computational cost.
However, unlike SparseFool, the proposed DEceit is a black-box technique which
can be directly extended to UAA and thus can serve as an attractive alternative.
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5 Conclusion
In this article, we introduced DEceit, a black-box pixel-restricted universal (non-
targeted) adversarial perturbation technique. We expressed the task of finding
a universal perturbation as a constrained optimization problem. For effectively
solving this real-valued high-dimensional optimization problem, we devised DEceit
by modifying the DE algorithm through the incorporation of a novel mix of the
mutation switching strategy along with a uniform random scale-factor switching
scheme. We also introduced an encoding scheme which can implicitly impose the
sparsity constraint. Finally, we empirically validated the capability of DEceit to
perform effective, imperceptible, and robust adversarial attacks.
A direct extension of our work may focus on the two contradictory objectives
of maximizing the effectiveness of a perturbation while minimizing the visual
distortions, which can be expressed in the form of a high-dimensional multi-
objective optimization problem, solvable by a tailored DE variant. One may also
consider using DEceit for searching a perturbation in a transformed space instead
of the native image space, following [9].
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